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
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
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California



THESIS

THE TRUST:
THE CLASSIC EXAMPLE
OF SOVIET MANIPULATION

by


Stephen A. Harris

September 1985

Thesis Advisor:

S.A. Garrett

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The Trust:
The Classic Example
of Soviet Manipulation

by

Stephen A. Harris
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., The American University, 1971

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

This thesis covers the career of the organization which came to be known as "The Trust." It is the classic example of Soviet deception and manipulation which proved to be very successful in neutralizing, for a period of about six years, the many and varied "White" Russian emigre groups which abounded in Europe after the Russian Revolution. It also lured back into Russia many of the leaders of these various Russian groups who were committed anti-Bolsheviks; the two most important victims were Sydney Reilly (Britain's "Master" spy) and Boris Savinkov (Kerensky's War Minister and a former terrorist under the Czars).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	9
	A. TIMELINE	11
	B. CAST OF MAJOR CHARACTERS	19
II.	THE TRUST - BACKGROUND AND BEGININGS	22
III.	BORIS SAVINKOV	31
IV.	SYDNEY REILLY	46
V.	THE TRUST - FINALE AND FINISH	54
VI.	CONCLUSION	59
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	63
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	66

DEDICATION

This Thesis is
Respectfully and Sentimentally
Dedicated to

Admiral of the Fleet
The Late Earl Mountbatten of Burma,
KG, PC, GCB, OM, GCSI, GCIE, GCVO, DSO, FRS.

Lord Louis,
The Last King-Emperor's
Last Viceroy

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The author would like to thank the entire faculty of the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School; just about every one of them contributed to this thesis in one way or another.

In particular I would like to thank my two advisors, Dr. Stephen A. Garrett and Dr. Jiri Valenta for giving me so much time, guidance and such consideration.

I would also like to thank Dr. Raymond Rocca, formerly of the CIA, for his truly generous assistance.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This thesis was conceived during the execution of the great American pastime of watching television. The show was a PBS presentation called Reilly: Ace of Spies and it was based on a book by Robin Bruce Lockhart who is the son of the British envoy to the Bolshevik party after the Russian Revolution started in 1917. Reilly's story is fascinating and has become one of the main themes of this paper. Ian Fleming, the author of the well known "James Bond" books, was the primary assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence during World War II; he said of Reilly, "James Bond is just a piece of nonsense I dreamed up. He's not a Sidney Reilly you know." The last part of Reilly's life was dedicated to combating an organization that had grown up in Russia calling itself "The Trust." All this, and much more, was portrayed in the PBS series and led to the author's obtaining permission to write this thesis. I have never enjoyed writing a paper so much.

I. INTRODUCTION

To write a history of any Secret Service is to tilt against a great many windmills.¹

With these words Richard Deacon begins his narrative of A History of the British Secret Service. As will quickly become understood, if it is difficult to write anything about the intelligence services and operations of an open, democratic society, it is almost impossible to write anything that can be academically proved and accepted about a closed, totalitarian society's intelligence service and operations. The difficulty is further compounded by the world situation following World War I and in the early 1920's. When World War I ended people tried to carry on as they had after every other previous war but, somehow, the "Great War" had fundamentally changed all the rules that people lived by; success in surviving and living day-to-day could almost be measured by how soon you recognized the fundamental change that the war had brought about. The Romanov Czars had been replaced by the Bolshevik Commissars inside Russia, which was probably the most extreme example of how the new world could and would act. The age of the end justifying the means was dawning around the world, and it was a shabby replacement indeed for the world that had ended when Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, presciently intoned on 3 August, 1914 "The lamps are going

¹Richard Deacon, A History of the British Secret Service, (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1969), p. 1.

out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime."²

Outside Russia there were many groups (mostly emigre but also some western intelligence services) who only existed to bring down the new Bolshevik regime.

Counter-revolutionary forces of every hue and complexion, from monarchists to Mensheviks, were organizing to overthrow the Soviet regime.³

This thesis will cover the career of the organization which came to be known as "The Trust." It proved to be very successful in neutralizing, for a period of about six years, the many and varied "White" Russian emigre groups which abounded in Europe after the Russian Revolution. It also lured back into Russia many of the leaders of these various Russian groups who were committed anti-Bolsheviks; the two most important victims were Sydney Reilly (Britain's "master" spy) and Boris Savinkov (Kerensky's War Minister and a former terrorist under the Czars).

The thesis will consist of an introduction, chapters on the background of the Trust, Boris Savinkov, Sydney Reilly, the end of the Trust with its effects and a conclusion. A slight departure from normal format will place what would normally be appendices as sections immediately following this introduction in order to assist the reader, as in any good Russian novel, with the cast of characters and the sequence of events.

²Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, (New York: Dell Publishing Co. Inc.), p. 146.

³Richard K. Debo, Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinskii Plot? Journal of Modern History, V 43, September, 1971, p. 413.

A. TIMELINE

Chronology of The Trust (T), Boris Savinkov (S) and Sydney Reilly (R)

- 1874 (R) Reilly born in Odessa on 24 March. Real name was Sigmund Rosenblum.
- 1879 (S) Savinkov born in Kharkov. Father was a civil servant who became the Judge of the Military Court in Warsaw.
- 1890 (R) Attended university in Vienna, studied chemistry.
- 1893 (R) Returned to Odessa to see dying mother, unknowingly carrying a letter for a Marxist organization. Arrested by the Ochrana, spent a week in jail.
- 1893 (R) Ran away to South America.
- 1896 (R) Arrived in London, changed his name to Sydney Rosenblum.
- 1897 (R) First job for the British Secret Service, sent to Russia to determine their interest in Persia.

- 1898 (R) Reilly married on August 22.
- 1899 (R) Changed his name to Sydney Reilly.
- 1899 (S) Savinkov expelled from Petersburg University for participating in student disorders. Continued education in Berlin and Heidelberg. Returned to Russia.
- 1899-1902 (R) Reilly operated in Holland to determine Dutch aid to the Boers in South Africa.
- 1902 (S) Banished to Siberia for five years, escaped to Geneva.
- 1902 (R) Sent to Persia to determine the possibility of oil. Returned with recommendations that the British should buy the oil rights and split Persia with the Russians.
- 1903 (R) Working in Port Arthur and advising the British Secret Service of events prior to the Russo-Japanese War. Reportedly took a year off, after sending his wife back to London, to travel around China; became somewhat interested in Oriental mysticism.
- 1903 (S) Joined the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party.
- 1904 (R) Returned to London just prior to Russo-Japanese War. Sent to Germany and infiltrated

the Krupp shipyards. Obtained copies of Krupp naval designs and returned to England.

- 1904 (S) As a member of the SR's "Battle Organization," Savinkov organized the assassination of the Minister of the Interior (and head of the Police) V.K. Plehve on July 15th. Became deputy head of the Battle Organization.
- 1905 (R) Reportedly posed as a French Cure to prevent a Mr. D'Arcy from selling his oil rights in Persia to the French. Convinced D'Arcy to sell to the British, beginning of British Petroleum (BP).
- 1905 (S) On February 4th Savinkov organized the assassination of the Governor-General of Moscow, the Grand Duke Sergius (who was also the Uncle of the Czar). Afterwards, he left for Geneva.
- 1907 (Approx) (S) Wrote his first novel, "The Pale Horse."
- 1909 (Approx) (S) Wrote his second novel, "What Never Happened (That Which Was Not)."
- 1910-1914 (R) Moved to St. Petersburg as a British agent. Set himself up in society, worked for a Russian armaments firm and became the Russian agent for the German firm of Blohm and Voss. In this position he was able to obtain and forward copies of all German Naval designs to England.

1914-1916 (S) Correspondent in France.

1914 (R) Reilly had bigamously married a Russian Countess. They moved to Japan for a few months then New York. (Lockhart dates this second marriage as 1916 in New York).

1916-1917 (R) Joined the Royal Canadian Flying Corps (RCAF), returned to England and conducted spying missions throughout Germany.

1917 (S) Returned to Russia after Revolution broke out. First appointed as Commissar of the South Western Group of Armies, became Deputy Minister of War in Kerensky's Provisional Government.

1917 August. (S) The Kornilov Affair. Became Military Governor of Petrograd for three days. Fired by Kerensky. Expelled from the SR Party.

1917 October (November). (S) Bolshevik takeover. Savinkov immediately began a counter-revolutionary career. Organized the "League for the Defence of Country and Liberty." Approached Bruce Lockhart, the British representative; received no money. Approached the French Military Mission; did receive funds.

1918 (R) Sent to Russia by Lloyd George, supposedly to overthrow the Bolsheviks in any way he could. Started to organize a coup with himself as the new head of Russia. First met Boris Savinkov.

1918 July. (S) Instigated an uprising at insistence of the French, idea was to form a line from Archangel south through Vologda and Kazan, with the French landing in Archangel. Savinkov took and held Yaroslav for a few days. The French did not actually land until sometime in August. Savinkov left Russia via Vladivostock in late 1918.

1918 August (R) Coup planned for August 28, using the Lettish Regiments, during the meeting of the Soviet Central Executive Committee. When this meeting was postponed (possibly at Dzerzhinsky's insistence because he had wind of trouble), Reilly changed the coup date to coincide with the new committee meeting date, September 6.

31 August 1918 (R) Dora Kaplan, an SR, shot Lenin. He did not die but, as a result, Dzerzhinsky started a "reign of terror" that, knowingly or unknowingly, decimated Reilly's planned coup. Reilly escaped back to London.

Dec 1918-Mar 1919 (R) Sent to South Russia to report on White Russian strength and activities.

1919 (R) Attended the Paris Peace Conference. First met Winston Churchill, introduced Churchill and Savinkov.

1919 (S) Lived in Paris, represented Kolchak and Denikin, responsible for Allied liaison, propaganda and supplies. Met Churchill and Lloyd George.

1919 (T) Dzerzhinsky started planning an operation designed to draw prominent anti-communists back into Russia.

1920-1923 (R) Fund raising for Savinkov.

1920 (S) After defeat of Kolchak and Denikin, Savinkov was invited to Warsaw by Marshal Jozef Pilsudski; raised Russian volunteers to fight with the Poles during the Russo-Polish War.

1 December, 1920 (T) Lenin directed Dzerzhinsky to formulate plan to "neutralize" the emigre threat and capture or eliminate various emigre leaders. He responded with several plans, one of which was the Trust, which included both aims.

1921 (S) Polish-Soviet Peace. Savinkov expelled from Poland, returned to Paris. Visited Prague for awhile; received no help.

Late summer, 1921 (T) Yakushev stops in Reval, Estonia and explains the existence of the Trust.

Feb, 1922 (T) Cheka replaced by the GRU.

1922 (S) Savinkov visited Mussolini; received no help.

1922-1923 (T) heavy flow of information coming from the Trust to "White" organizations, building reputation.

1923 (S) Wrote his last novel, "The Black Horse."

18 May, 1923 (R) Married Pepita Bobadilla, again bigamously. He had previously divorced his Russian wife, but had never divorced his first wife, Margaret.

June, 1923 (T) first meeting between Yakushev and "White" general, held in Berlin.

1924 (early) (T) Yakushev received by Grand Duke Nicholas.

1924 July (S) Decides to return to Russia. Had received a letter from his lieutenant, Pavlovsky, to come to Russia and assume command of the underground organization. Reilly came from New York to try to persuade him not to go.

1924 August (S) Arrested in Minsk on the 20th. Showcase trial, ended on the 29th. Sentenced to death with a recommendation for mercy. Commuted to 10 Years.

1924-1925 (S) In prison. Visited by western newsmen. Asked why he returned, "I would rather see those towers (the Kremlin) from a prison cell than walk freely in the streets of Paris." A French reporter asked, "Are the GPU horror stories true or false?" Savinkov replied, "Speaking for myself they are obviously untrue." Trillisser ended the interview.

1925 May 7 (S) Savinkov died, jumped (or pushed) from his cell window.

1925 September (R) Reilly enters Russia. Stalin orders that Reilly be arrested and then shot.
Executed on November 5 (?).

1926 (T) Growing distrust of Trust by "Whites" and western intelligence organizations.

April 13, 1927 (T) Oppenput defects and breaks cover of the Trust.

B. CAST OF MAJOR CHARACTERS

Biographical Data

Artuzov: Chief of the Counter Intelligence Department, ran the Trust, died in the Purges.

Felix Dzerzhinsky: First head of the Cheka, founded the Trust on Lenin's order, died 20 July, 1926.

General A. P. Kutyepov: head of "White" Combat Organization (CO) which was designed to conduct acts of terror against the Bolsheviks. Even though he had complete faith in his cousin, Maria Shultz, the General always had reservations about the Trust. He always ran some of his agents into Russia without the Trust knowing. Became leader of the "Whites" after the deaths of Grand Duke Nicholas and Baron Wrangel, kidnapped in Paris by the OGPU on 26 January, 1930, fate unknown.

Edward Oppenput: Financial head of the Trust, Soviet counter-intelligence agent who may actually have worked for Savinkov and the SR's prior to being coerced into working for the Cheka and the Trust. Defected and provided the final proof that broke the cover of the Trust, went back into Russia on a raid with Maria Shultz, probably killed, fate unknown.

General N.M. Potapov: A Czarist general who was appointed Chief of the General Staff by Lenin on 23 November, 1917. He worked for the Trust until it ended, adding credence to the organization. Died February, 1946.

Sydney Reilly: British secret agent who almost reversed the Bolshevik takeover in a planned coup attempt in 1918. Introduced Savinkov to Churchill and others in 1922. Killed by the Trust (?) and helped destroy it in the process, probably executed in November, 1925.

Boris Savinkov: Deputy to Kerensky as War Minister, Leader of the Social Revolutionary (SR) party. Arch-enemy of Lenin and Dzerzhinsky. Never really accepted by most monarchist elements because of his part in the assassination of Grand Duke Serge and other high ranking Czarist officials before the end of the monarchy. Captivated Reilly and Churchill but was never able to obtain concrete support from Western Governments. Lured back into Russia by the Trust, put on trial and reported to have committed suicide by jumping (pushed) from a window of the Lubianka on May 7, 1925 (?).

Maria Shultz: Trusted courier of General Kutyepov, made many trips back and forth into Russia and actually lived in Moscow until 1927. Firmly believed in the Trust. Was unwittingly responsible for Reilly's death by convincing him to go into Russia. Carried on long affair with Oppenput but never realized true nature of the Trust until they both left Russia in April, 1927, and Oppenput broke the cover of the Trust. She met with Pepita Reilly and apologized for her part in luring Reilly back into Russia. She went into Russia with Oppenput in May, 1927, on a raid, fate unknown, probably killed.

Trillisser: Ran scientific espionage, Deputy to Dzerzhinsky for the Trust, probably died in the Purges.

General Baron P.N. Wrangel: One of the best "White" generals and, also, one of the few who had any political acumen. Regent of the South Russian Government in the Crimea and last Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Russian Army. After losing the Crimea he organized what was left of the Russian Army into the "World Organisation of Russian War Veterans (known as the ROVS). Died in April, 1928.

Alexander Yakushev: leader of the Trust as far as the West was concerned. Originally a Monarchist who was coerced into working for the Cheka and the Trust. Was very convincing when dealing with any of the emigre organizations, received by Grand Duke Nicholas once and usually attended meetings of the Supreme Monarchist Council. Reportedly died in the late Thirties, fate unknown.

II. THE TRUST - BACKGROUND AND BEGININGS

At 3:00 PM on 15 March, 1917 Czar Nicholas II abdicated the Throne of All the Russias in favor of his son. Czar Alexis II only reigned for about eight hours. Near midnight on that day Nicholas signed a new abdication document (an illegal act since he was no longer the Czar) abdicating for both himself and his son in favor of his brother Michael. Czar Michael II also only reigned for a short time, abdicating two days later in favor of the Provisional Government. The Romanovs had ended their three hundred and four year dynastic rule with hardly more than a whimper.

The Provisional Government lasted approximately eight months. Lenin and the Bolshiviks grasped power during the October Revolution of the same year and started the form of government that still rules Russia today. The immediate result of this grasp of power by an extremely small group was that Russia was racked by civil war for the next three to four years between so many groups that it would be impossible to list them all, but who have been simplistically classified as the "Whites" and the "Reds." An important, though often overlooked, result of all this turmoil and upheaval in Russia was the large number of people of all types who fled from Russia. The Special Refugee Committee of the League of Nations estimated the figure at 844,000 Russians.⁴ Lennard Gearson says, ". . . at least a million Russian refugees, including some 150,000 followers of General Wrangel, had fled their native land and

⁴Roland Gaucher, Opposition in the USSR 1917-1967. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969), p. 123. as quoted from unpublished paper of J. Markowicz.

were now scattered in enclaves from Belgrade to New York.⁵ These are significant numbers in either case, and numbers that were never far from Lenin's mind, as will soon be seen.

These emigres could be divided into two camps: those who held Monarchist feelings and wanted a Romanov restoration (determining who was the legitimate claimant was a problem, compounded by the uncertainty surrounding the alleged death of Czar Nicholas II and his family); and those who held more democratic feelings and wanted a restoration of a Duma and representative government such as the Provisional Government under Kerensky had been. These two groups were described by Richard Wraga, the head of the Russian section of the Polish General Staff as follows: "Partisans of the Czarist regime and adversaries of any kind of revolution;" and "Partisans of the February revolution of 1917 and adversaries of the Bolshevik upheaval in October 1917."⁶ Within these two major groupings were many splinter groups which covered a wide portion of the political spectrum. The only common denominator that held for all the groups was their hatred for the Bolshevik regime that had assumed power in Russia. Unfortunately the only thing this common hatred of the Bolsheviks produced was the fertile ground necessary for the Trust to succeed. The whole spectrum of the various organizations proved Goethe's observation, "We are never deceived, we deceive ourselves."⁷ As with most exile groups throughout history, the various Russian groups had great

⁵Lennard D. Gearson, The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), p. 234.

⁶Richard Wraga, "Russian Emigration After 30 Years' Exile," in Russian Emigre Politics, edited by George Fischer, (New York: Free Russian Fund, Inc., 1951), p. 35. as quoted from unpublished paper of J. Markowicz.

⁷Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Views of Deception and Strategic Surprise: The Invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan," in Strategic Military Deception, edited by Donald C. Daniel & Katherine L. Herbig, (New York & Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 348.

difficulty in agreeing on any united plan of action or common goals.

The emigre threat was probably one reason for the announcement of the New Economic Policy announced by Lenin in March of 1921. It was officially designed to give Russia the necessary time to recover from the devastation she had suffered during World War I and the following civil wars and interventions. It may have also been put into practice because the Bolsheviks knew they were still very much a minority government within Russia and had the constant threat of the emigres and hostile Western governments on the outside. Some measure of internal popular support was necessary and this new policy might have been one way to get some.

The perceived threat of external hostility from the emigre's and the Capitalist states was not another example of the legendary Russian paranoia. It was real and was seen as a life and death struggle by some of the leading personalities on both sides. On 22 June, 1919, Churchill wrote of Lenin, Trotsky and the Bolshevik leadership in the Weekly Dispatch:

Theirs is a war against civilised society which can never end. They seek as the first condition of their being the overthrow and destruction of all existing institutions and of every State and Government now standing in the world. They too aim at a worldwide and international league, but a league of the failures, the criminals, the unfit, the mutinous, the morbid, the deranged, and the distraught in every land; and between them and such order of civilisation as we have been able to build up since the dawn of history there can, as Lenin rightly proclaims, be neither truce nor pact.⁸

This shows the feelings of both Lenin and Churchill. Boris Savinkov was even more explicit. He declared to Somerset Maugham:

⁸Martin Gilbert, Churchill's Political Philosophy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 75.

Between me and Lenin, it's a war to the death. One of these days he will put me with my back to the wall and shoot me, or I shall put him with his back to the wall and shoot him. One thing I can tell you is that I shall never run away.⁹

The Trust thus came into being from various ideas and plans that Dzerzhinsky presented to Lenin. Lenin always worried about the threat of counter-revolution, especially from the emigre groups.¹⁰ Dzerzhinsky was more concerned with the leaders of these groups. During the Lockhart Plot¹¹ Dzerzhinsky had run across Reilly and Savinkov and was determined to bring them under his control and destroy them. These two themes, the neutralization of the emigre threat and the destruction of their most important leaders, were the primary reasons for the creation of the Trust. Lenin and Dzerzhinsky deserve some credit for their forehandedness; even while the civil war was raging and the Allies were conducting their various but uncoordinated interventions, these two stalwarts of the Revolution had no guarantee that they were going to win but, nevertheless were already planning ways to take care of the emigre problem:

⁹Paul W. Blackstock, The Secret Road to World War Two: Soviet versus Western Intelligence, 1921-1939. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 69.

¹⁰One of Lenin's more famous sayings (for which a citation is yet to be found) concerned people he did not trust. He called them "Radishes - red on the outside but White on the inside."

¹¹The Lockhart Plot was the name given to the attempted assassination of Lenin by Dora Kaplan, a member of the Social Revolutionary (SR) Party, who (acting on her own) shot Lenin on August 31, 1918. The resulting mass arrests by the Cheka foiled a real coup that Reilly had arranged originally for 28 August but had had to change to 6 September. The plan was to use the Lettish Regiments (the Bolshevik Revolutions Praetorian Guard) who guarded Lenin to arrest and remove the Bolshevik leadership during a meeting of the Soviet Central Executive Committee. Lockhart and Reilly were both sentenced to death by the Bolsheviks as a result of this episode.

As early as December 1, 1920, Lenin had directed the chairman of the VCheka (Dzerzhinsky) to devise a plan for neutralizing these most irreconcilable foes (the emigres) and to prevent the formation of combat units capable of striking inside Soviet Russia.¹²

The Cheka and Dzerzhinsky had embarked on their first major attempt at deception and foreign manipulation.

As stated previously, the Trust was thought about "as early as December 1, 1920." This date is when Lenin officially told Dzerzhinsky to set something up to counter or neutralize the emigre threat. If this is when Lenin directed something officially, it can be assumed that they had been thinking about it beforehand. It did not take long for the Trust to start getting attention outside Russia.

A Monarchist group already existed inside Russia which was called the Monarchist Organization of Central Russia (MOCR). When Dzerzhinsky had submitted his first report to the Central Committee on the MOCR he had been instructed not to crush it but to infiltrate it, possibly bring it under covert control and through it, possibly infiltrate the emigre organizations throughout Europe.¹³

The Cheka was able to accomplish all this through the person of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Yakushev,¹⁴ a Monarchist who belonged to the MOCR. The sources conflict over when and how Yakushev (and Edward Oppenput)¹⁵ became Cheka agents, but they all agree that they were coerced and converted. Yakushev made a trip to either Switzerland or Norway during the summer of 1921 in his capacity as a consultant for water-transport problems. He had stopped in Reval to give a personal message to a friend who was a

¹²Gearson, p. 234.

¹³Blackstock, p. 22.

¹⁴See Cast of Characters.

¹⁵See Cast of Characters.

former Czarist officer and who was then working for the British Embassy in Reval. During this visit he told his friend of the existence of the MOCR. He told Captain Artomonov

"... that although he was serving the Bolshevik regime, he was opposed to it and that, in this, he was by no means alone. He said that many ex-Tsarist officials and officers remained strongly anti-Bolshevik at heart. So heavily were the government and the Red Army infiltrated by this element that the Bolshevik regime itself was undergoing a subtle change; hence the NEP.

Captain Artomonov, who was an agent of the Supreme Monarchist Council and British Intelligence, wrote a letter to the council describing Yakushev's observations. Somehow the Cheka obtained a copy of this letter which was used to arrest Yakushev when he returned to Russia. He eventually became a confirmed Cheka agent. Once his conversion was complete, the subversion of the MOCR (later renamed the Moscow Municipal Credit Association in keeping with the New Economic Policy and giving a more realistic reason for the ease of travel of Yakushev and others¹⁷) was assured.¹⁸ The next step was to "win over or neutralize" the head of the MOCR, a General A.M. Zayonchovsky. The Cheka did this quickly and easily by threatening to kill his wife and daughter. After that Zayonchovsky moved Yakushev up within the MOCR organization.

"... within the first six months of the Trust operation the OGPU had considerably advanced the position of Yakushev, its "defector in place," within the organization until he was expected abroad, and had gained firm control over all organized monarchist communications with the Moscow group. Second, it also

¹⁶The Rand Corporation, The Trust. (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, ND), pp. 3-4.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 34.

seems clear that the OGPU had secured the cooperation of the founder of the MOCR, General Zayonchovsky, who henceforth was in fact reduced to a mere figurehead, obviously under adequate control - the threat hanging over his wife and daughter. Unknown to the lower echelon groups within the Trust, the OGPU had thus seized the "commanding heights" of the organization and achieved covert control.¹⁹

Yakushev made his first trip to Berlin in November of 1922 to meet with representatives of the Supreme Monarchist Council.²⁰ He obviously made a good impression:

According to all available evidence, Yakushev produced an impression of great daring, energy and intelligence. Moreover, he had considerable charm, and though not a very good orator, he spoke with an utter lack of heroics and bravado, in an even, serene, indeed almost indifferent tone of voice and yet at the same time with obvious knowledge of what he was talking about and with absolute conviction. More important still, his patriotism seemed so genuine and what he said resembled so little the gloomy reports that had been his listeners' main diet since they fled their country; it was so hopeful and corresponded so completely to what they wished to hear, and what they wished to believe, that - human nature being what it is - he seems to have had little difficulty in convincing them that he was telling the truth.²¹

Goethe's observation again, with a vengeance.

When Yakushev returned to Russia he started to send information to the emigres:

"... at first Yakushev was as good as his word: throughout the winter of 1922-1923 a steady flow of information on a variety of subjects kept coming out of Russia via the Trust. The gist of it all: Russia was stirring."²²

¹⁹Ibid., p. 40.

²⁰The Supreme Monarchist Council (SMC) was an umbrella organization for the various emigre factions. The titular and nominal head was the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, an uncle of the Czar and the last Russian Army Commander in Chief during World War I until the Czar assumed personal command.

²¹Geoffrey Bailey, The Conspirators. (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1960), p. 7.

²²Ibid., p. 8.

The Trust, in the person of Yakushev was establishing credibility within the "White" circles. Their military leaders started to meet with Yakushev: in June, 1923 he met with General E.E. Klimovich, Baron Wrangel's²³ Chief of Intelligence (Wrangel never believed in the Trust and would not meet with them himself but he did allow his intelligence chief to do so); Yakushev later met (in company with Lieutenant General N. M. Potapov)²⁴ with General N.A. von Monkewitz and General A.P. Kutypov,²⁵ these two (the first willingly, the second unwillingly) arranged for him to be received by the head of the Supreme Monarchist Council, The Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich ROMANOV in late 1924, a remarkable achievement, even though Kutypov suspected them all along.²⁶

At all these and future meetings, Yakushev always repeated the party line of the Trust:

The emigres should go slowly, conserve their strength and train troops for the day of restoration, rather than waste their energies in senseless acts of terror. Above all, they should wait until the Soviet regime was ready to collapse from within, avoiding the fatal error of a premature attack which would risk everything. Moreover, restoration of the monarchy would ultimately depend on the internal support of a powerful monarchist party, which the Trust represented. The future government should be made up mainly of those who struggled for it inside Russia, and who had lived there throughout the difficult years.²⁷

It may seem surprising that the last part of this litany was accepted by the emigre Monarchists, but it probably added to the credibility of the Trust. Unless you believed from the start that everyone connected with the Trust were OGPU

²³See Cast of Characters.

²⁴See Cast of Characters.

²⁵See Cast of Characters.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 12-13.

²⁷Blackstock, p. 45.

agents; and, fortunately, many "White" leaders and Western intelligence agency heads did, you would have to feel that since it was the members of the Trust who were the ones that had not fled Russia and were taking all the risk, then they deserved the rewards.

The Trust was now known, accepted and operating; its first goal of neutralizing the emigre groups as a threat was going very well. The second goal, luring certain of the anti-Bolshevik leaders back into Russia now comes into play. The two most important victims, Boris Savinkov and Sydney Reilly, are the subjects of the next two chapters.

III. BORIS SAVINKOV

This chapter will cover the career of Boris Savinkov.²⁸ Before the Russian Revolution he was an anti-Czarist terrorist and a member of the Social Revolutionary (SR) Party who participated in the spectacular assassinations of the Czar's uncle, the Grand Duke Serge and the Minister of the Interior, V.K. Plehve. After the fall of the Romanov Dynasty he eventually became the Deputy War Minister in Kerensky's Provisional Government. He was instrumental in what became known as the "Kornilov Affair"²⁹ which, unfortunately, backfired and did much to bring the Bolsheviks to power by discrediting and destroying the remaining power and prestige of the Provisional Government. When the Bolsheviks seized power he quickly became involved with movements against them within Russia, including leading a short lived military takeover of the town of Yaroslav. He then became important as a spokesman and leader of the various "White" groups that were in place in the various countries circling Russia. He eventually was lured back into Russia by the Trust. He was given a "showcase" trial in 1924 and sentenced to die. This sentence was commuted to imprisonment for a period of ten years. He died in 1925, when he either jumped or was pushed from a window of the Lubyanka Prison.

²⁸See Cast of Characters and this chapter.

²⁹An abortive incident during the summer of 1918 that, eventually, led to the downfall of the Provisional Government of Kerensky. Savinkov had arranged for General Kornilov to enter St. Petersburg to provide support for the Provisional Government against unrest within the city. Kerensky felt they were coming to depose him and he freed Trotsky and the other Bolsheviks who were in jail (Lenin had fled to Finland) in order to assist in the defense of the city.

He is that extraordinary product - a Terrorist for Moderate aims.³⁰

With these words, Sir Winston Churchill elevates Boris Savinkov from the ranks of the average terrorist, politician or emigre to the company of the august. Churchill's book, Great Contemporaries, starts with a chapter on the Ex-Kaiser (Wilhelm II of Germany) and ends with a chapter on His Majesty King George V. In between, along with others, is a chapter on Boris Savinkov. This selection alone would pique one's interest in the man. Further investigation provides many other facets of the man that validate Churchill's selection of this fascinating individual. He was a product of the Russian middle class who became; first an assassin and terrorist, then a newspaper correspondent and novelist, then a politician and Deputy War Minister, then a propagandist and emigre, and finally, a spectacle and an example.

He does not seem to have been born to be a terrorist; when one of his bomb throwers did not throw his bomb at the Grand Duke Serge's carriage because the Grand Duchess and her children were in the carriage, Savinkov agreed, and they waited until the Grand Duke was alone in his carriage before they assassinated him. He did want, or thought he wanted, a democratic system of government for Russia. What he really wanted was a system where he would have some power. To get it, he was obviously prepared to do whatever he felt was necessary to achieve his goals. Churchill described his reasons for resorting to terrorism:

His life was devoted to a cause. That cause was the freedom of the Russian people. In that cause there was nothing he would not dare or endure. He had not even the stimulus of fanaticism. He was that extraordinary

³⁰Sir Winston S. Churchill, KG, Great Contemporaries, (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1937), p. 104.

product - a Terrorist for moderate aims. A reasonable and enlightened policy - the Parliamentary system of England, the land tenure of France, freedom, toleration and good will - to be achieved, whenever necessary by dynamite at the risk of death.³¹

Savinkov would agree. By his own admission he was not a fanatic. When asked by Somerset Maugham in 1917 if it had taken a great deal of courage to assassinate the Grand Duke Sergius and the Minister of the Interior, V. K. Plehve, he had replied; "Not at all, believe me. It is a business, like any other. One gets accustomed to it."³² During his trial in 1924 Savinkov described his life by saying:

"... how he lived always cut off from human life, cut off from the workers and peasants, always under the shadow of shameful death, always utterly apart, from men and women who lived and loved in the sunlight."³³

He ended his description with the phrase,

I lived always in the watertight compartment of the conspirator. I knew nothing of the Russian masses.³⁴

These do not seem to be statements of a man who enjoys terrorism for its own sake, rather they show a man who is almost a poet, a man who has an ideal and a goal. Savinkov's own feelings on assassinations are given by the hero (obviously based on Savinkov) of his first novel, The Pale Horse

³¹Ibid.

³²Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War against Soviet Russia, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1946), p. 128.

³³The New York Times, August 29, 1924.

³⁴Ibid.

Why shouldn't one kill? And why is murder justified in one case and not in another? People do find reasons, but I don't know why one should not kill. And I don't understand why to kill in the name of this and that is considered right, while to kill in the name of something else is wrong.¹⁵

The monologue is as contradictory as many other facets of his life.

Unfortunately for him, he began his adult life facing the Czarist regime and ended it facing the Bolshevik regime.

During the first part of his life he waged war, often single-handed, against the Russian Imperial Crown. During the latter part of his life, also often single-handed, he fought the Bolshevik Revolution. The Czar and Lenin seemed to him the same thing expressed in different terms, the same tyranny in different trappings, the same barrier in the path of Russian freedom.¹⁶

Boris Savinkov spent his life trying to bring to Russia what may have been, and probably is, an antithetical system to the Russian masses:

In the final analysis, what he tried to attain by dynamite, murder and blood, was nothing more than the reasonable norms of freedom and toleration as they were practiced in the Western World.¹⁷

Not everyone seems to have been as impressed with Savinkov as Churchill was:

More even than most Russians, Savinkov was a schemer - a man who could sit up all night drinking brandy and discussing what he would do the next day. And when the morrow came, he left the action to others.¹⁸

¹⁵Boris Savinkov, The Pale Horse, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1919), p. 57.

¹⁶Churchill, Great Contemporaries, p. 104.

¹⁷Dimitry V. Lehovich, White Against Red: The Life of General Anton Denikin, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973), p. 141.

¹⁸Sir Robert B. Lockhart, Memoirs, pp. 181-82, cited by

Another negative opinion was made to Savinkov directly by his fellow emigre Busetsov.

" . . . that while Savinkov had shown himself capable of planning and conducting short term individual operations, he had never been and never would be fit to handle any large scale long term organized effort."³

Kerensky's opinion of his Deputy War Minister was quite succinct: "Savinkov was of course double crossing."⁴⁰

General Kornilov's opinion was hardly any more flattering:

"No, I don't trust Savinkov either. I don't really know whom he wants to stab in the back, Kerensky or me."⁴¹

Finally, and possibly the most interesting, is Trotsky's summation of Savinkov:

" . . . a mighty seeker of adventures, a revolutionist of the sporting type, one who had acquired a scorn for the masses in the school of the individual terror, a man of talent and will."⁴²

Edward Van de Roher, Master Spy: A True Story of Allied Espionage in Bolshevik Russia, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1981), p. 39. In another book, The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, the editor, Kenneth Young, stated that while Churchill and Maugham adored Savinkov, Lockhart, on the other hand, "completely distrusted" him. Pepita Reilly, wife of British spy Sydney Reilly, also distrusted him.

³⁹David Footman, B.V. Savinkov, (Oxford: St Anthony's College, 1956), p. 32.

⁴⁰Lehovich, White Against Red, p. 505. This quote was found in a footnote of Lehovich's book, describing an interview between Lehovich and Kerensky, and is Kerensky's response to a question regarding Savinkov's role in the Kornilov Affair.

⁴¹Alexander Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1965), p. 379. The quote is from Vladimir Lvov's (he had been the Procurator of the Holy Synod in the March Cabinet under Prince Lvov, a "minister" of religion) own account of a conversation with General Kornilov, one of many during this time when Lvov was a self-appointed go-between who everyone accepted, it seems, but neither side had appointed as an emissary.

⁴²Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution. Volume Two: The Attempted Counter-Revolution, 3 vols. (New

Just when you almost feel that you have the measure of the man, when you have him neatly categorized, you find something that, at first throws you completely off. One irregularity was the fact that, while he was an emigre, his calling cards were inscribed, Ancien Ministre de Guerre. Another is the following story related by one of his assistants. Savinkov was talking about the head of the Provisional Government, Alexander Kerensky, who was showing some Western visitors around one of the Czarist palaces. Kerensky was fingering the button on one of the Czar's uniforms which was on display hanging in a cupboard. Savinkov said:

That was disgusting, I must tell you. Tsars may be killed, but familiarity even with the uniform of a dead Tsar cannot be tolerated.³

Can this statement really have been made by the same man who had engineered the assassination of the same Czar's uncle, the Grand Duke Sergius in 1905. It can only be interpreted as a uniquely Russian attitude. One may assassinate a Romanov, as a symbol of the Autocracy, but one does not get familiar with a Romanov. This statement also reflects his growing movement towards the right. This perceptible shift to the right was partly necessitated by a need for useable forces which the emigre monarchists had, much more so than the emigre socialists who had already expelled him anyway; it was also more: "...the socialist Savinkov may well have been the precursor of those other former socialists who, a few years later, founded the Fascist movement."⁴

York: Simon and Schuster, 1932), II, p. 195.

³Fedor A. Stepan, Byosheie i Nesbyvsheesia, (New York, 1956), II, p. 83 cited by Lehovich, White Against Red, p. 141.

⁴Lehovich, White Against Red, p. 141.

Once again Savinkov surprises us. In an interview conducted in 1921, he expressed his new political ideology as follows:

1. Every effort to overthrow the Bolshevik armies by a foreign armed force is doomed to failure.
2. Every effort to overthrow the Bolsheviks by means of an organization which is permeated with the spirit of the old order of things in Russia is doomed to failure.
3. Only a widespread mass movement by people in Russia who have succeeded in adapting themselves to the new frame of mind of the Russian peasantry will make an end of the Bolshevik reign.⁴⁵

This would seem to indicate that, while he may be moving to the right for practical reasons (money and men), and also because he could not abide the Bolsheviks, he never really had far to go:

As was the case with many members of his party, Savinkov's "socialism" apparently did not go beyond a tolerably liberal republicanism.⁴⁶

Another source confirms his movement to the right:

Savinkov, who had formerly been in the revolutionary underground, was now (1917) a moderate with leanings towards the right.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Boris Savinkov, Memoirs of a Terrorist, (New York: Albert & Charles Boni, 1931), pp. 352-53.

⁴⁶William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 1917 - 1921, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935), I, p. 193.

⁴⁷Richard Lockett, The White Generals: An Account of the White Movement and the Russian Civil war, (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), p. 65.

Later he would state that the Bolsheviks may have been right all along to reject participatory democracy as the governmental form for Russia, and insist on their own "centralized control." At his trial he recanted by saying:

I was wrong. Our Russia isn't ready for self-government. You (the Bolsheviks) knew it and I didn't. I admit my fault.⁴⁸

He probably did not really mean this; it is extremely hard to imagine that he would renounce his life's work just because he was on trial.

However, even with these conflicting opinions and observations, Churchill seems to have best caught the spirit of the man; ". . . the essence of practicability and good sense expressed in terms of nitro-glycerine."⁴⁹ and the life he had to face:

A hard fate, an inescapable destiny, a fearful doom! All would have been spared him had he been born in Britain, in France, in the United States, in Scandinavia, in Switzerland. A hundred happy careers lay open. But born in Russia with such a mind and such a will, his life was a torment rising in crescendo to a death in torture.⁵⁰

We have dealt with what sort of man he was, how he started and what he became. Now we will move to how he was lured back into his native Russia to meet his fate.

Boris Savinkov had been living in Paris since he was asked to leave Poland at the end of the Russo-Polish War in 1921. He was still trying to drum up support from Western

⁴⁸The New York Times, August 29, 1924.

⁴⁹Churchill, The World Crisis, V: 78, cited by H. Hessel Tiltman, The Terror in Europe, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1932), p. 158.

⁵⁰Churchill Great Contemporaries, p. 105.

Governments but he was also, unfortunately, becoming more and more addicted to drugs, accounting for his periods of frantic activity followed by lethargy. His strong and dedicated right arm during this period was Sydney Reilly,⁵¹ Britain's "master" spy, who still had many connections with British and other Western intelligence agencies but who was not "officially" working for any of them at this time. Savinkov was beginning to realize that although the Western Governments all agreed with him that the Bolshevik regime was evil and should be replaced, none of them had the inclination to act aggressively against them; even the Fascist government of Mussolini was lukewarm in its support.⁵² Savinkov had started to become very disillusioned and was ready to be pulled in:

Although the exact timing of the events is not clearly established, as the OGPU trap began to close around Savinkov early in the year (1924), he received a letter from Pavlovsky (one of Savinkov's agents inside Russia who had been turned by the OGPU) appealing to him to return to Russia to lead a full-scale uprising against the Soviet regime, which was supposedly in a vulnerable position since the death of Lenin in January. According to Winston Churchill, in June 1924 Savinkov also received an invitation to return from Trotsky and Kamenev, both of whom were members of the Soviet Politburo at the time, promising that if he would agree to stand a mock trial, he would be granted an immediate amnesty and be given a responsible position in the Soviet administration. Then in July two Russian couriers, one of them known personally by Savinkov, arrived in Paris with a second letter from Pavlovsky urging him to return as soon as possible.⁵³

Reilly counseled Savinkov not to go, but on August 10, 1924 he left Paris for Russia. On August 29, Izvestia announced that Savinkov had been arrested and tried. He was sentenced to death but it was commuted to a ten year sentence when he

⁵¹ See the Cast of Characters and the next chapter.

⁵² Robin Bruce Lockhart, Reilly: Ace of Spies, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1984), p. 139.

⁵³ Blackstock, The Secret Road, p. 79.

recanted and acknowledged the Bolsheviks as the undisputed rulers of Russia.

After the trial Savinkov was given a very comfortable cell and was even visited by foreign journalists, one of whose account is absolutely fascinating:

Savinkov's cell - the last one visited - was the biggest surprise of the day. It was a beautifully furnished room with thick carpets on the floor, a large mahogany desk, a blue-silk-upholstered divan, and pictures on the walls. The great conspirator was clean-shaven and smelled of perfume as though the barber had just left him. Most astonishing of all was his state of mind. He behaved like a wealthy and gracious host receiving visitors. Is this mere bravado, I wondered, or absolute courage?

We plied Savinkov with questions, to each of which he had a quick, tactful, brilliant answer. He spoke Russian and French with equal ease. Asked what made him return to Russia, he stepped to the window. Pointing to the Kremlin, he said: "I would rather see those towers from a prison cell, than walk freely in the streets of Paris!"

In our admiration and pity, for to most of us he was not only a valiant leader but a brilliant writer, we avoided asking any questions that might embarrass him in the presence of his jailers. But there was one exception. Much to our chagrin, a French correspondent asked a question that instantly put Savinkov on the defensive, compelling a choice between evasion and danger: "Are the GPU horror stories true or false?"

The prisoner replied: "Speaking for myself they are obviously untrue."

I looked at Trillisser (a senior official of the GPU who was accompanying the correspondents on their tour). His black eyes flashed with anger. The prisoner, like everybody else in the room, could not help noticing the poor impression "speaking for myself" had made on the Chekist. Yet Savinkov went on talking like a free man until Trillisser put an end to the interview with one word: "Pora!" (It's time!) The effect of that word was instantaneous. Savinkov turned pale and stopped talking. He still smiled as he saw us to the door, but it was a forced smile.⁵⁴

A very long but most interesting quote that gives an unusual glimpse inside the Lubyanka. Savinkov was finished: "For he had served his purpose, he had been brought to his knees and

⁵⁴William Reswick, I Dreamt Revolution, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), p. 9, 10.

made to abjure the cause for which he himself and many likewise dedicated men had sacrificed so much. As an opponent, he was no longer dangerous; as a friend, the Reds had no use for him."⁵⁵

Boris Savinkov lived during the most momentous period of his country's history to date. He fought to end the Czarist regime of the Romanov Dynasty by assassination and terror; then struggled to overthrow the Bolsheviks by propaganda and subversion after they had wrested power away from the Provisional Government. His place in history is by no means assured since he ended up on the losing side. William Henry Chamberlin's scholarly work on the Russian Revolution, published in 1935, contains a number of references to Savinkov. As has been noted above, Savinkov has his own chapter in Churchill's Great Contemporaries, published in 1937. However, by 1962, when Professor Anatole G. Mazour published what is now a standard history of Russia, Savinkov's name is nowhere to be found.

He may deserve a place in history if only for his performance during his trial. He had, among other things, listed his four reasons for fighting the Bolsheviks:

Then came the triumph of the idea to which I have devoted my life, the triumph of revolution. Then you, who now represent revolutionary Russia, seized the reins. I turned against you for four reasons.

First, my life's dream had been the Constituent Assembly. You smashed it, and iron entered my soul. I was wrong. Our Russia isn't ready for self-government. You knew it and I didn't. I admit my fault.

Second, the Brest-Litovsk peace, which I regarded as a shameful betrayal of my country. Again I was wrong and you were right. History has proved it, and I admit my fault.

Third, I thought that Bolshevism couldn't stand, that it was too extreme, that it would be replaced by the other extreme of monarchism, and that the only alternative was the middle course. Again I was proved wrong, and again I admit it.

⁵⁵Bailey, The Conspirators, p. 47.

Fourth, and the most important reason. I believed that you didn't represent the Russian masses, the workers and peasants. I lived always in the watertight compartment of the conspirator. I knew nothing of the feelings of the Russian masses. But I thought that they were against you, and so I, who have given my life to their service, set myself against you also.⁵⁶

He went on to say that he had to come back to see for himself how it was in Russia now (1924). His final statement, before sentence was pronounced, was a plea that his life's work not be misjudged;

I know your sentence and I don't care. I'm not afraid of it, nor of death. But one thing I do fear - that the Russian people will misjudge me and misunderstand my life and its purpose. I never was an enemy of the Russian people. I devoted my life to serve them. I have made mistakes, but I die unashamed and unafraid.⁵⁷

His performance during his trial was summed up in a New York Times' editorial ; he had recanted either because he felt it was all over or in order to live to fight another day.⁵⁸ In either case he gave nothing away that would endanger anyone the Bolsheviks had under their control and could have immediately taken action against. While he seems to have recanted and given the Bolsheviks everything they wanted and

⁵⁶The New York Times, 29 August, 1924.

⁵⁷Ibid. It is not hard to see why Churchill admired him so much, they were two of a kind. In the chapter on Savinkov in Great Contemporaries, Churchill relates the following story: he had taken Savinkov to Chequers to meet the Prime Minister, Lloyd George. During their conversation the PM had said that "revolutions, like diseases, run a regular course, the worst is over in Russia." Churchill writes that Savinkov replied "in his formal way"; "Mr. Prime Minister, you will permit me the honour of observing that after the fall of the Roman Empire there ensued the Dark Ages." Michael Kettle, in his book Sidney Reilly: The True Story, relates a later meeting between Lloyd George and Savinkov at Lloyd George's private home. When Savinkov entered Lloyd George and his family were singing. They continued to sing and "especially for the latter's (Savinkov) benefit, Lloyd George and family sang: "God Save the Tsar."

⁵⁸The New York Times, September 1, 1924.

had the death penalty commuted to a ten year sentence, the Bolsheviks knew enough not to let go of him.

Savinkov remains, not really an enigma, but certainly a contradiction. Born into the Russian Imperial Civil Service, trained as an assassin, appointed as a War Minister, and ending up as one of the most well known of the "White" leaders.

How do you get on with Savinkov? I (Churchill) asked M. de Sazonov when we met in Paris in the summer of 1919.

The Czar's former Foreign Minister made a deprecating gesture with his hands.

"He is an assassin. I am astonished to be working with him. But what is one to do? He is a man most competent, full of resource and resolution. No one is so good."

The old gentleman, gray with years, stricken with grief for his country, a war-broken exile striving amid the celebrations of victory to represent the ghost of Imperial Russia, shook his head sadly and gazed upon the apartment with eyes of inexpressible weariness.

"Savinkov, Ah, I did not expect we should work together."⁵⁹

He almost seemed to enjoy being a contradiction. Nowhere is this contradiction more apparent than in Savinkov's role during the Kornilov Affair. Many books have been written on the Russian Revolution, all of which agree that the Kornilov Affair was the critical point that allowed the demoralized and disorganized Bolsheviks to recoup and eventually seize power. At the pivotal point of this critical instance stood one Boris Savinkov, his one great chance in history, and he seems to have failed.

Of these three (Lvov, Filonenko and Savinkov) only Savinkov seems to have been actuated by motives beyond the narrowly personal. It was his genuine wish to achieve a union between Kerensky and Kornilov who, he argued, if they could be persuaded to combine could bring order to the country without sacrificing the gains

⁵⁹ Churchill, Great Contemporaries, p. 103.

of the Revolution. As it was, Savinkov blundered, gained the full confidence of neither man, and left them still further along the path of misunderstanding⁶⁰

Sir R.H. Bruce Lockhart, who did not like Savinkov, observed;

He was a patriot and a man of action, but intrigue was in his blood, and in this tragically mismanaged affair there is little doubt that he saw his role as mediator between Kornilov and Kerensky, and was, in fact, trying to unite them in spite of themselves.⁶¹

Once again, Sir Winston Churchill has the last word on the subject;

A little more time, a little more help, a little more confidence, a few more honest men, the blessing of Providence and a rather better telephone service - all would have been well.⁶²

Even his death is a contradiction. The Soviets say he committed suicide "by throwing himself from the window of his cell."⁶³ His wife was "convinced her husband was assassinated and that he did not commit suicide."⁶⁴ Mrs. Pepita Reilly has her own version of Savinkov's death.

It was, therefore, decided to settle matters once and for all. A suitable opportunity was all that was required and this soon presented itself. Savinkoff wrote his famous letter addressed to Dzerjinski. After this letter Savinkoff was poisoned and his corpse flung out of the window of the office of the "Inner" prison situated on the fifth floor.

⁶⁰Luckett, The White Generals, p. 73.

⁶¹Sir R.H. Bruce Lockhart, The Two Revolutions, (London: The Bodley Head, 1967), p. 107.

⁶²Churchill, Great Contemporaries, p. 107.

⁶³The New York Times, May 13, 1925.

⁶⁴Ibid., May 20, 1925.

It was officially announced that Savinkoff had committed suicide and, by way of indirect proof, the letter to Dzerzhinski was published in the papers.⁶⁵

It is very doubtful he committed suicide unless he was under the influence of drugs, which he may well have been. In that case, they would have had to have been supplied by the jailers.

Savinkov, in many ways, is somewhat representative of Russian political culture. He had participated in terrorist acts against the Czarist state, but would have probably ended up restoring the monarchical order in some form if he had achieved power. He could probably best be classified as a confused Tory.

Assassins only go down in history in footnotes, and Savinkov hadn't even thrown the bombs. Authors sometimes gain immortality, but Savinkov's literary efforts would certainly not earn him a grave in Poets Corner at Westminster. Emigres only go down in history if they somehow return and win, Savinkov only returned.

⁶⁵Sydney Reilly, *Britain's Master Spy*, (London and New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1933), p. 281-82. In his letter to Dzerzhinsky, written the same day he is supposed to have died, Savinkov said, "Either shoot me or give me a chance to work. I was against you, now I am for you. I cannot endure the half and half existence."

IV. SYDNEY REILLY

Reilly was still left outside Russia and "Reilly was the man Dzerzhinsky most wanted."⁶⁶ Reilly, like Russia, is also an enigma. He used to claim that he had been born in Ireland but did admit, on occasion, that he had been born in Odessa (he was actually born in Odessa on 24 March, 1874). His services to the British intelligence services prior to and during World War I had already made him legendary. This chapter will not cover his entire career (partially outlined in Table One, Timeline) but will, instead, focus on Reilly's attempted coup in 1918 that almost toppled the Bolsheviks and his activities between his departure from Russia after the unsuccessful coup and his probable death in 1925 following his final return to Russia; the period when he was continually raising funds to combat the Bolsheviks and the Trust.

Reilly returned to Russia in April, 1918, after an absence of almost four years. He was sent by the British Government with various roles to play. Lloyd George wanted first hand information⁶⁷ and he had reportedly instructed Reilly to overthrow the Bolsheviks in any way possible. The Admiralty wanted Reilly to assist Captain F. Cromie, RN, the British Naval Attache in Russia, in blowing up the Russian Baltic Fleet, if necessary, to prevent it from falling into German hands.

⁶⁶Richard Deacon, A History of the Russian Secret Service, (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1972), p. 255.

⁶⁷Lloyd George no longer had any confidence in the reports being forwarded by his previously selected personal representative, Robert Bruce Lockhart, who continued to advise against any sort of intervention by the Allies and that, given time, the Bolsheviks might start a new front against the Germans on their own.

Upon his arrival in Moscow, Reilly is reported (by both Kettle and Lockhart) to have marched up to the Kremlin gates and demanded to see Lenin. He was admitted and was seen by Bonch-Brouevich, a close friend of Lenin. Reilly told Bonch-Brouevich that he had been sent personally by Lloyd George to report first-hand on the Bolshevik government's true intentions, since they were dissatisfied with Lockhart's reports.⁶⁸

After this bold, if not slightly ludicrous, gesture was made, Reilly went underground and started to plan and organize his coup. The main thrust of the planned coup was to use the Latvian regiments, who guarded Lenin and the Kremlin, to remove Lenin, Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders.

The Letts were the only soldiers in Moscow. Whoever controlled the Letts controlled the capital. The Letts were not Bolsheviks; they were Bolshevik servants because they had no other resort. They were foreign hirelings. Foreign hirelings serve for money. They are at the disposal of the highest bidder. If I could buy the Letts my task would be easy.⁶⁹

It was to be a classic "palace revolt" such as the Bolsheviks themselves had used the previous year.

Reilly used many aliases, including "Commissar Relinsky of the Cheka," in order to safely travel around and between Moscow and St. Petersburg. He built up a considerable network of agents, either women he seduced or men he bought off. The money Reilly used to finance this coup usually came from Lockhart, who was easily able to raise it by the writing out of drafts on British banks in exchange for Roubles on the spot; Russians of all political persuasions

⁶⁸Michael Kettle, Sidney Reilly: The True Story, (London: Corgi Books, 1983), p. 24. Also, Robin B. Lockhart, p. 82.

⁶⁹Reilly, p. 21.

were happy to make the exchange. His second, and more worthwhile, source of funds was British Pounds sterling received from Captain Cromie, funds that had been assembled to ensure the Baltic Fleet was sunk, but never used.

Within two weeks of meeting the "hypnotic Reilly," Lockhart started to send reports back to London recommending Allied intervention.⁷⁰ It is not completely clear whether Lockhart believed that Reilly had actually been sent by Lloyd George, but he did start providing the funds necessary for Reilly to have any sort of chance at all with the coup. The stage was set for Reilly to implement his plan.

In a recently found article, by Richard K. Debo of Simon Fraser University, Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinskii Plot the possible seeds of the Trust can be found. Debo advances the idea that Dzerzhinsky knew all along what was going on with the Latvian regiments and allowed it to continue (just as he was to do later with the MOCR, which developed into the Trust). Reilly had planned to implement his coup attempt during the announced meeting of the Soviet Executive Central Committee on 28 August. Apparently this meeting was only postponed because of the insistence of Dzerzhinsky.⁷¹ When the postponement was announced, Reilly merely changed the date of his coup to the new scheduled date for the committee meeting, September 6, and decided to use the time to go to St. Petersburg and confer with Captain Cromie. While he was in St. Petersburg, Dora Kaplan, a member of the Social Revolutionary (SR) party, shot Lenin. In the "reign of terror" that followed, unleashed by Dzerzhinsky, many of the people involved in the planned coup were arrested and executed.

⁷⁰Debo, p. 425.

⁷¹Most Western sources place the blame for the failure of the "Lockhart Plot" on a French journalist, Rene Marchand, who later admitted he had warned the Bolsheviks of an impending coup.

Reilly may well have come close to overthrowing the Bolsheviks, but, Debo maintains:

"... there were two conspiracies, that of Dzerzhinskii, which successfully entrapped Lockhart, and the wild scheme of Reilly, which the Cheka was easily able to crush. The two were bound together by Dzerzhinskii's agents. Lockhart and Reilly believed they were using these men for counterrevolutionary purposes, while, in fact, the Chekists were using the British agents for the purpose of counterespionage. Behind everyone stood Dzerzhinskii, into whose hands came the threads of both conspiracies and who ultimately controlled the fate of everyone involved."²

This theory is supported by William H. Chamberlin who said:

"... it would seem that the "Lockhart Plot" was a compound of actual advances of money, of which the Cheka probably found some trace, and of fanciful schemes which the Cheka agents laid before the too credulous and too imaginative Reilly."³

While it is probably true that the Cheka had some idea that something was afoot, it is more likely that the coup was foiled by the informant Rene Marchand. If Dzerzhinsky really knew what was going on he would not have had to postpone the meeting. The only thing that changed between 28 August and 6 September was the attempted assassination of Lenin, unless Dzerzhinsky arranged that as well.

Reilly escaped Russia and his death sentence and on his return to England he was awarded the Military Cross (MC) and had become known as Britain's "master" spy.

During this final period one of his most interesting accomplishments was the production of the Zinoviev Letter.⁴ Most evidence today agrees that this letter was a forgery

² Debo, p. 439.

³ Chamberlin, II, p. 69.

⁴ The Zinoviev Letter was allegedly sent to the British Communist Party exhorting them to set up Red cells within the British Army and prepare for a general strike, which could possibly lead to a revolution.

conceived by Reilly. When it was published in England, just prior to a general election, it had the effect of bringing down England's first Labour Government and returning the Conservatives to power.

The rest of Reilly's life was spent raising funds for anti-Bolshevik activities of various sorts, and supporting himself and Savinkov. This interesting personality - called "hypnotic" by Debo, "too credulous and too imaginative" by Chamberlin, "Napoleonic" by Sir Robert B. Lockhart and even reported by his one time secretary, Eleanor Toye, to have "thought he was Jesus Christ" - this most complex individual, threw himself into his final battle which was to cost him his life.

In early July, 1924, Reilly left New York and went to Paris to see Savinkov. The Communist account of the Trust operation states that: "Reilly approved a secret trip of Savinkov to Russia."⁷⁵ This account is directly contradicted by both Kettle and Lockhart. Kettle states: "Reilly was then in New York and travelled especially to Paris to warn Savinkov not to go."⁷⁶ Lockhart's version is more emphatic: "For several days he (Reilly) argued with Savinkov, urging him not to go, but to no avail."⁷⁷

He had returned to New York after Savinkov had gone into Russia in order to carry on a legal battle with an American company in order to recoup a promised substantial commission fee. On January 24, 1925, Commander Boyce, the British S.I.S. agent in Reval and an old friend of Reilly, sent him a letter asking for his help in assessing the true strength

⁷⁵Lev V. Nikulin, The Swell of the Sea, (Springfield, VA.: National Technical Information Service. 12 April, 1972.) This book provides the Soviet story of the Trust, which is quite unbelievable, as this account of the Reilly/Savinkov meeting shows.

⁷⁶Kettle, p. 112.

⁷⁷Robin B. Lockhart, p. 140.

of the Trust as he had recently been visited by Maria Shultz and her husband. She had convinced Boyce that the Trust was preparing the way for a new revolution in Russia within two years.⁷⁸ Reilly had never met Shultz but he knew her superior, General Kutypov. Letters were exchanged throughout the summer until Reilly lost his court case. He then returned to Paris on September 3, 1925. Events moved quickly, and on 25 September Reilly was in Vyborg (near the Finnish border) with Shultz and her husband, meeting with Yakushev. He was convinced by Yakushev and Shultz to make a quick trip into Russia in order to meet the Political Council of the Trust. Reilly entered Russia that night and was not seen again in the West. The Soviets said at the time that he had been killed on the night of 28/29 September trying to cross back into Finland. Years later, the Soviets, through Lev Nikulin's The Swell of the Sea, said he had been captured by the OGPU, coerced into giving information and then executed. There have been some allegations that the information the Soviets were able to extract from Reilly before his death enabled the Soviets to penetrate the British Secret Service to the extent that it did. Other varied accounts range from Reilly going over to the Reds before he went in, to being seen in the Middle East just prior to World War II.

The theme of Reilly having been a Bolshevik agent, either late in life or throughout his entire career, is brought up in several of the sources, especially in Edward Van Der Rhoer's book Master Spy. While anything is possible when dealing with Sydney Reilly, it is highly unlikely that Reilly, who had said his one goal in life was "to give up my life to Russia to help rid her from this slavery

⁷⁸Blackstock, pp. 89-90.

(Bolshevisim), that she may be a free nation",⁷⁹ was really a double agent. It is true that throughout his career he had always been careful not to do anything while in British service that he considered would be harmful to Russia, in his mind, Russia and the Bolsheviks were very definitely two distinct entities. While it is also true that his political leanings had always been slightly left of center, they are probably the same sort of leanings that, had he ever come to power in Russia, would have made him the same sort of political leader as Savinkov would have been (given the opportunity), an early socialist who matured into a rightist of some description, not quite a monarchist.

An interesting postscript to Reilly's career is found in the Spectator on 17 May, 1968. Tibor Szamuely, a defector of the fifties and an extremely astute observer of the Soviet system, wrote a column about a popular children's book in Soviet Russia entitled The Gadfly. This book was written in 1897 by Ethel Lilian Voynich, an Englishwoman who later married a Polish revolutionary. It was about the Italian secret societies in the 1830s and 1840s and contains "anti-clericalism, revolutionism and high-coloured romance." The Czarist regime tried to suppress it, which only made it more popular. Since the revolution, over four million copies, in forty-nine languages, have been printed in the USSR; it has also been made into movies, plays and an opera. The hero, an Englishman named Arthur Burton, has consistently topped most polls in the USSR as the favorite literary hero of "right-minded Soviet youth." In 1955 the author was discovered, by Soviet journalists, to be living in New York City. When she was asked who had been the model for Arthur Burton she had replied, "No, I'm afraid I can't remember . . . It was all so long ago." She died in 1960,

⁷⁹Robin B. Lockhart, p. 118.

at the age of 96. Within the Soviet Union her death was mourned as that of a great national figure. Mr. Szamuely, when he read Lockhart's Reilly: Ace of Spies, discovered that Mrs. Voynich, before she had married, had had a brief affair with Reilly; that, in fact, one of Soviet Russia's most popular literary figures, Arthur Burton, is really based on one Sydney Reilly.⁸⁰

⁸⁰Tibor Szamuely, "The Gadfly and The Spy." Spectator, 17 May, 1968.

V. THE TRUST - FINALE AND FINISH

After the deaths of Reilly and Savinkov the Trust was almost completely discredited in the West:

By the fall of 1925, then, the Trust had lost all credibility with British intelligence. Since the British had considerable influence, especially in the Baltic area, probably other Western intelligence agencies also began to reevaluate the situation and their relationships with the Trust.⁸¹

The Cheka made one last attempt at maintaining the credibility of the Trust by inviting another well known "White", V. V. Shulgin,⁸² into Russia to look for his missing son. During this trip Shulgin became convinced that the Trust was a formidable organization and, upon his return to the West, published a book entitled The Three Capitals: Travels in Red Russia, which gave an account of his trip. He even went so far as to send it to his "friends" in the Trust for their editing prior to its publication. This book made its appearance in early 1927, shortly before the Trust was finally exposed for all time.⁸³

⁸¹Blackstock, p. 106.

⁸²Shulgin had been a well known conservative member of the Duma prior to the revolution. He was one of two Duma members who had travelled to the Imperial train to work out and receive the instruments of abdication (one legal and one illegal, as noted previously) from the last Czar of All The Russias, Nicholas II. Shulgin's face had been so well known that he had to disguise himself during his trip throughout Russia, visiting Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. He became a prisoner of the Soviets when they invaded Yugoslavia in 1944. He was sent to Russia and imprisoned until 1956. He lived in Vladimir until his death on February 15, 1976.

⁸³V. V. Shulgin, The Years: Memoirs of a Member of the Russian Duma, 1906-1917, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1984), p. xiv.

The final blow for the Trust came in April of 1927 with Oppenput's defection. Oppenput had been the financial head of the Trust and was also the agent charged with keeping Maria Shultz busy during her years in Moscow^{*4} which had led to an affair between the two. In early April, Oppenput thought he was about to be liquidated^{*5} and he and Shultz crossed into Finland on April 13, 1927 (Shultz's husband happened to be in Reval at the same time). Oppenput turned himself in to the Finnish Army and

"... began writing his defector's report, in which he claimed that he had been an OGPU agent since late 1921, when he had been arrested, tortured, and brought over (at about the same time as Yakushev, with whom he claimed to have shared a cell in the inner prison of the Lubyanka).^{*6}

On May 31, 1927, Shultz, Oppenput and four others entered Russia on the orders of General Kutyepov to conduct a terrorist raid. Shultz and Oppenput are believed to have been killed. With this raid, the Trust was certainly killed; it no longer had any credibility in the West.

The effectiveness of the Trust is, on the whole, supported in most of the sources. Bailey and Gearson tend to be somewhat enthusiastic and admiring while Blackstock tends to be somewhat more guarded in his assessment. The Trust built itself up to the position that, "For nearly three years, beginning in 1924 and through the spring of

^{*4}He obviously did a good job; even when he was confessing and giving the whole history of the Trust to the Finns, Shultz had a hard time believing him.

^{*5}Stalin had started to execute anybody who had been associated with the Trust, but only after Dzerzhinsky's death in 1926. It would seem that when Stalin had first found out about the Trust he had wanted to liquidate anyone involved. Dzerzhinsky had stopped him, either by convincing him of the usefulness of the organization or by direct threat against Stalin. In either case, Stalin did not move until Dzerzhinsky died.

^{*6}Blackstock, p. 114.

1926, the Trust thus virtually monopolized all undercover contacts between the U.S.S.R. on the one hand and the White para-military organizations and their Western friends on the other."⁸⁷ This shows the effectiveness of the Trust in fooling these intelligence organizations.

In the area of emigre dissension, the Trust can be marked as very successful, but , on the other hand, it did not take much to make sure the varied emigre groups did not get along:

It is difficult to evaluate the Trust's contribution to the sowing of dissension among the White Russian emigre groups in Berlin, Paris, and Yugoslavia. Emigre movements are by definition more or less split into competing political factions, depending on the leading personalities involved, and the problem of uniting them for political-warfare purposes has historically proved very difficult of solution. Undoubtedly both Yakushev and General Potapov in their liaison missions abroad were able to play one emigre faction against another, although built-in rivalries were a major factor in keeping the emigres disunited. Ironically, the question of how to evaluate the Trust became a subject of continuing dispute between Wrangel and Kuteyepov.⁸⁸

Coincident with emigre dissension was the area of "White" inaction. The Trust was extremely successful in both, but especially in preventing the "Whites" from conducting terrorist attacks. In his book The Conspirators, Bailey points out that:

It should be remembered that the Trust was essentially an adjunct of the NEP. And for almost four years, while the NEP helped put Russia's economy back on its feet, the Trust had successfully contributed to lull the more extremist White emigres and their Western friends into a state of complacent optimism.⁸⁹

⁸⁷Bailey, p. 13.

⁸⁸Blackstock, p. 118.

⁸⁹Bailey, p. 13.

Blackstock's book, The Secret Road, views it from a slightly different angle:

The myth thus developed that the OGPU, through the Trust, successfully paralyzed all counterrevolutionary activity. Actually the Trust, as such, merely added the finishing stroke to self-imposed paralysis, so far as the top leadership of the Berlin monarchists was concerned. The younger men associated with the Monarchist Council were soon disgusted with the inactivity of its top leadership, and suggested that the Trust should turn elsewhere,⁹⁰ - to Generals Wrangel and Kutypov - for assistance.

He continues this theme by saying:

The Trust's influence on emigre tactics is also clearly discernible. Yakushev was highly persuasive in his arguments that terrorist tactics were counterproductive. But his line that the emigres should conserve their assets abroad while a strong underground monarchist movement prepared the way for a counterrevolutionary seizure of power coincided with the position already taken by the VMC in Berlin before his visits. There can be little doubt that General Kutypov's strategic-services teams, stimulated by such activists as Maria Zakharchenko (aka Shultz), would have started their diversionary actions sooner, and probably on a larger scale, had it not been for the dampening influence of the Trust.⁹¹

The best summation of the Trust and its accomplishments was found in Gearson's book, The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia. He said:

The Trust not only succeeded over a period of several years in neutralizing the leading anti-communist emigre organizations in western Europe, but also led to the capture and death of Boris Savinkov and Sydney Reilly, two of the most daring anti-Bolshevik conspirators of the time.⁹²

⁹⁰Blackstock, p. 118.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 118-119.

⁹²Gearson, p. 235.

For once the Soviet version, provided by Nikulin, does not differ too much from the West's version, at least as far as the results of the Trust are concerned:

During the following days (after 13 April, 1927) in Moscow and in other areas they arrested all members of the MOTsR, the true revolutionaries. The "Trust" ceased to exist. The counterintelligence operation of the OGPU which had lasted for almost six years, was terminated. It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of this operation. The "Trust" during all of these years served as a lightning rod which thwarted the intrigues and terroristic acts of the rabid White emigre movement and the counterrevolutionary groups within the nation. The figures of the "Trust" such as Yakushev, Potapov, Langouvy and other Chekists, showed rare skill in dealing with this secret war which was forced upon the Soviet Union by its enemies.⁹³

⁹³Nikulin, pp. 230-231.

VI. CONCLUSION

" . . .Russia - it is a riddle wrapped in a mystery
inside an enigma"

Winston S. Churchill

The 1920s were chaotic at best. The "Great" war was over and the West wanted to enjoy its just rewards. The main thesis of Blackstock's book is that the "secret" war began when the Bolsheviks took over and has been going on ever since. The Trust is only the first case study he uses. In August 1920, Winston Churchill agreed, writing: "The Bolshevik aim of world revolution can be pursued equally in peace or war. In fact, a Bolshevik peace is only another form of war."⁴

The Trust was highly successful in the two missions outlined in the Introduction: it was very effective in neutralizing the emigre threat; and it lured Boris Savinkov and Sydney Reilly to untimely deaths inside Russia. It had also duped the "White" and Western intelligence services at one time or another. These had taken Trust information over that from other sources available to them.

At one time Trust agents succeeded in gaining the support of ten governments, including Great Britain, France, Poland and Bulgaria, who were interested in purchasing intelligence about the USSR and in destabilizing the Soviet government.⁵

⁴Gilbert, p. 77.

⁵William R. Corson & Robert T. Crowley, The New KGB. (New York: William Morrow and Company, INC, 1985), p. 449, testimony of David H. Dubrowsky (Soviet defector and head of the Russian Red Cross in America, a Soviet front organization in the United States) before the House Committee on UnAmerican Propaganda Activities, 1939, Vol 8., pp. 5162-67 and 5241-43.

When the Trust finally collapsed there were still intelligence people who would not believe it had been a fake, because they could not credit the Cheka with the depth and experience to have perpetrated the deception:

The Soviet secret police had bested the anti-Communist emigres, publicly exposing the ineptitude and naivete of the conservatives. The Trust's halo of power, ability, and solidarity vanished; the hopes of the right-wing emigres diminished; the emigration was demoralized.⁹⁶

That the Trust did not do better in duping external intelligence services was, fortunately, due to the presence of usually skeptical senior people; Cummings in MI6,⁹⁷ Wrangel in his organization, and Kutyepov (sometimes) with the Supreme Monarchist Council, who couldn't accept this organization as a genuine counterrevolutionary group that was operating inside Russia without the knowledge and participation of the OGPU. This healthy scepticism may not exist today.

How does the Trust impinge on today? Deacon's book on the Russian Secret Service uses as an example of a "Trust" style operation the defection of Polish Intelligence Lt. Colonel Mikhail Goleniewski's defection to the West on Christmas Day, 1960. Goleniewski claimed to be Alexei Nicholaevich Romanov (Czar Alexei II, if Nicholas II's second instrument of abdication is deemed illegal), the son of Nicholas II. More recently the Christian Science Monitor ran a story called "KGB defector talks about former job in 'ethnic espionage'." The following synopsis is quoted for effect:

⁹⁶Shulgin, p. xiv.

⁹⁷Acronym for British Secret Intelligence Service.

Mr. Imants Lesinskis spent 23 years working in various positions for the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) prior to his 1978 defection to the United States.

"... Lesinskis says he was blackmailed into working as a KGB informer in Latvia in 1956."

"... Lesinskis directed a system for assembling and distributing disinformation to discredit Latvians and Latvian emigres throughout the world whom Soviet authorities had determined to be anti-Soviet. Latvian nationalists were prime targets."

"... There are an estimated 35,000 Latvian immigrants in the U.S. "Many people living in the West have ties to the old country and it is relatively easy for the KGB to use that nostalgia for the old country for their own purposes," Lesinskis says. "One of their main aims is to organize Soviet support groups that can invite KGB people of the native country into the US," he says. "What they do is split our emigre community in half," says Aristids Lambergs, vice-chairman of the Boston-based American-Latvian Cultural Exchange Committee. "It dilutes our strength. It gets us to fight among ourselves. They are very effective," Mr. Lambergs adds.

"... It is very difficult for the American government to counteract those ties because the American policy has been one of promoting human contact between emigres and their homelands," says Lambergs.

After writing this thesis and then reading the above article it was very easy to become confused as to which operation was being discussed; "the more things change, the more they stay the same."

The Trust is merely the first, though quite stunning, example of the Soviets' ability and willingness to use deception to obtain their goals. That they are very capable of carrying this out with "their national talent and propensity for deception"⁹⁹ is quite amply demonstrated by the entire Trust episode described in this thesis. All in all, the Trust is the classic example of Soviet deception at its finest. It also gave the Soviets a vital victory over

⁹⁹Warren Richey, "KGB Defector talks about former job in 'Ethnic Espionage', The Christian Science Monitor, 14 June, 1984.

⁹⁹Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Soviet Strategic Deception. Defense Science, V 3, No. 4, August, 1984, p. 84.

the Whites and the interventionist West at the time when the Soviet Union most desperately needed it.

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